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Abstract
In this entry I will offer a survey of the contemporary debate on fic-
tionalism, which is a distinctive anti-realist view about certain regions 
of discourse that are valued for their usefulness rather than their truth. 
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Fictionalism
Fictionalism about a region of discourse D is the thesis that utteranc-
es of sentences produced within D are, or should be regarded as, akin 
to utterances of sentences produced within discourse about fiction. 
Truth is not an essential feature of fictional discourse. Fictions are 
valued for other reasons. More specifically, the value that they have 
does not depend on the entities that would have to exist for them to 
be true. Typically, fictionalism about D is motivated by ontological 
concerns about such entities.  
For example, consider the following passage from Kurt Vonnegut’s 
Slaughterhouse Five introducing its main character, Billy Pilgrim:
Billy was born in 1922 in Ilium, New York, the only child of a bar-
ber there. He was a funny-looking child who became a funny-looking 
youth – tall and weak, and shaped like a bottle of Coca-Cola. (Von-
negut 1991: 23) 
Vonnegut utters these sentences to purport to describe Billy as be-
ing a certain way, by attributing to him a series of properties such as 
being born in Ilium, being the only child of a barber, and being tall 
and weak. We understand that Vonnegut is not aiming at truth: he is 
not reporting that someone really had these properties. He is merely 
pretending to do so, or he is prescribing or intending the audience 
to imagine that this was the case. We can accept, or imagine, what 
Vonnegut says. But typically we do not believe that this was the case. 
We know that there was no such person: Billy does not exist. Real-
ists about fictional characters argue that Billy is not a real person, yet 
he is something: an exotic entity such as a Meinongian non-existent 
object, a possible object, or an abstract object (see my 2013 entry 
on FICTIONAL ENTITIES from this Companion for a review of these po-
sitions). Anti-realists simply reject ontological commitment to any 
such entities and straightforwardly recognize that there simply are 
no fictional entities. So, when engaged in fictional discourse we ac-
cept, or imagine, the content of the relevant utterances without aim-
ing at truth. We value the fiction for other reasons.
Similarly, suppose one is a fictionalist about mathematics. Ac-
cording to the standard realist construal mathematics commits us 
to an ontology of abstract entities, i.e. objects that do not have any 
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spatio-temporal location and that are causally inert, such as num-
bers, functions, and similar things. A fictionalist about mathematics 
will say that mathematical statements cannot be true because there 
are no abstract entities. Yet, she would accept the content of such 
statements without really believing them. The value of mathematics 
is independent from its truth. Mathematics is useful to mediate infer-
ences between claims about concrete objects in deductive reasoning. 
Thus, fictionalism should be distinguished from eliminativism. 
Fictionalism and eliminativism are two distinct varieties of anti-re-
alism about a certain region of discourse. According to both of them, 
the sentences from D are systematically untrue – or simply false – 
because they involve apparent reference to certain exotic entities that 
do not exist, e.g. there are no numbers, or because nothing satis-
fies its characteristic predicates, e.g. nothing satisfies the commuta-
tive property. If we reject the exotic entities and the uninstantiated 
predicates of D, we might just eliminate D and stop inquiring about 
it. The fictionalist, however, retains the domain of inquiry because 
it has some other virtues, e.g. it is good, or it is useful for some pur-
poses.
In what follows I will briefly present some of the most paradig-
matic varieties of fictionalism, including some of its main histori-
cal precursors (Section 1). I will draw some important distinctions 
between different contemporary fictionalist approaches (Section 2). 
And I will discuss some of the main problems facing these contem-
porary varieties of fictionalism (Section 3).
2 Varieties of fictionalism
The analogy between fiction and other domains of discourse has 
many historical precursors, although not all of them fit the notion of 
fictionalism developed in the contemporary debate (see Rosen 2005 
and Sainsbury 2009: ch. 7 for two historical surveys of fictionalism). 
Some classify Pyrrhonism, a radical species of ancient scepticism 
defended by Sextus Empiricus, as a form of protofictionalism. The 
pyrrhonist is supposed to suspend any belief about herself and others 
in favour of some weaker notion of acceptance that would allow her 
to think and act (cf. Rosen 2005 for a critical discussion). Duhem 
(1913) argued for the controversial thesis that astronomical fiction-
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alism was an important and widely endorsed view since Plato and 
just until before the advent of 17th century modern physics. Duhem 
claimed that on this view the main aim of theoretical astronomy was 
to save the astronomical phenomena rather than to represent their 
true causes (see Rosen 2005 for a series of critical considerations 
about Duhem’s thesis).
Two examples of astronomical fictionalism that are often cited 
in the contemporary literature are two 16th century astronomers 
such as Andreas Osiander and Nicholas Ursus, who claimed that the 
best way to understand Copernicus’s heliocentric hypothesis was to 
assume it for the purpose of mathematical calculation without re-
ally believing that it was true. Osiander wrote the Introduction to 
Copernicus’s De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, where he writes: “It is 
not necessary that these hypotheses should be true, or even probable; 
but it is enough that they provide a calculus which fits the observa-
tions”. And similar remarks are made by Ursus in his De hypothesibus 
astronomicis tractatus where he says that astronomers “should fabricate 
hypotheses, whether true or false or feigned, of such a kind as may 
yield the phenomena. … and produce a method for calculating them 
and thus achieve the intended purpose and goal of this art” (reported 
from Jardine 1984: 39-40). 
Here are three more controversial cases. First, George Berkeley’s 
(1710: §51) invitation to “think with the learned, but speak with the 
vulgar” is often indicated as an example of fictionalism about materi-
al objects and causality. Berkeley did not claim, however, that all talk 
about them would be false. He thought that materialism was an inco-
herent view, and simply suggested to reinterpret material objects and 
causality as mind-dependent. Second, Jeremy Bentham is sometimes 
classified as a fictionalist about law (Ogden 1932). Bentham charac-
terised a legal fiction as “a false assertion of a privileged kind, and 
which, though acknowledged to be false, is at the same time argued 
from, and acted upon, as if true” (1989: 267). However, he also de-
fined such fictions as a “syphilis, which runs in every vein, and car-
ries into every part of the system the principle of rottenness” (2001: 
170). As a consequence, Bentham did not recognize any particular 
virtues to these fictions. Third, Nietzsche is sometimes considered 
as a fictionalist about moral values, because of his remarks about the 
mistakes involved in our ordinary discourse that would be useful for 
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our ordinary life (Hussain 2007). However, Nietzsche took the mas-
sive falsehood about ordinary life to be a reason for rejecting such 
discourse, and so it appears that he is not a fictionalist in the modern 
sense after all (Leiter 2015). Less controversially, Vaihinger (1911) 
has become the most influential precursor of scientific fictionalism 
(Fine 1993) because of his emphasis about the importance of fictions 
in scientific reasoning. But he could also be interpreted as a precur-
sor of moral fictionalism (among other areas) because of his fiction-
alist interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy: on Vaihinger’s view 
there are no categorical imperatives, i.e. there are no intrinsically 
motivating moral properties. 
More recently three major theories have influenced the contem-
porary debate on fictionalism: Mackie’s moral fictionalism, which he 
elaborated in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong published in 1977, 
Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, which he introduced in The 
6FLHQWLÀF,PDJH in 1980, and Field’s mathematical fictionalism, which 
he advanced in Science Without Numbers also published in 1980.
Mackie recognized that moral judgments are assertoric, that 
they involve beliefs in moral truths, and that these would commit 
us to the existence of moral properties such as goodness and bad-
ness, rightness and wrongness, duties and obligations, and more. 
Yet, there are no such entities and, as a consequence, moral asser-
tions are typically untrue. According to Mackie, there are no moral 
truths. Since ordinary moral judgments are substantially mistaken, 
Mackie introduced the notion of an error theory. At the end of his 
book, Mackie claims that moral discourse is a XVHIXOÀFWLRQ, but he 
does not further develop this idea. Some contemporary upholders 
of moral fictionalism try to do that in different ways. In particular, 
Nolan et al. (2005) offers a range of possible resources. And Joyce 
(2005) claims that morality can be a useful guide to action even if we 
do not believe it. The decision to adopt morality as a fiction is a sort 
of precommitment, i.e. a way of thinking that typically guides action 
in certain contexts. The fictionalist, like the realist, has internalized 
the same imperatives. However, when pressed to say whether any 
such moral imperative is really true, the realist will be disposed to 
assent while the fictionalist will be disposed to deny it. Nevertheless, 
for all practical purposes, their actions will be guided by the same, 
or by similar, moral principles. The attitude that the fictionalist will 
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assume towards such principles, however, will be one of make-be-
lieve rather than belief.  
Van Fraassen advanced his constructive empiricism as opposed to 
scientific realism. According to the latter, the aim of a scientific the-
ory is genuine truth, and acceptance of a theory involves genuine be-
lief. Furthermore, realists interpret a scientific theory at face value, 
hence accepting that the unobservable entities involved in scientific 
theories exist (e.g. Putnam 1975). According to Van Fraassen’s con-
structive empiricism the aim of a scientific theory is not truth and 
acceptance of a scientific theory may involve something less than be-
lief that the theory is true or some other attitude. The language of 
the theory should be construed at face value even though the theory 
needs not be true. When a scientist proposes a certain theory, she 
does not assert the theory but rather “displays it, and claims certain 
virtues for it” (1980: 10). The aim of a scientific theory is its empiri-
cal adequacy, which consists in an accurate representation of observ-
able phenomena. On this view, science does not permit belief beyond 
observable phenomena.
Field argues that if taken at face value mathematics commits us 
to a domain of abstract mathematical entities. According to the in-
dispensability argument put forward by Quine (1948) and Putnam 
(1975), we ought to believe in the existence of mathematical entities 
because they are indispensable to our best scientific theories. Field 
does not believe that there are any such entities and concludes that 
mathematics is largely false (see Benacerraf 1973 for an argument 
that influenced Field’s scepticism towards mathematical entities and 
according to which such entities would be unknowable). Yet, Field 
shows that mathematics can be useful. He reconstructs the Newto-
nian gravitational theory without quantifying over mathematical ob-
jects such as numbers. In this way he offers a nominalistic construal 
of the mathematical statements involved in the Newtonian theory. 
On the assumption that such a nominalisation is available, at least 
in principle, also in other areas of scientific inquiry then one can as-
sume an error theory of mathematics. Thus, mathematics does not 
need to be true to be good. Instead, its virtue resides in its being use-
ful for making inferences between nominalistic statements. (Other 
mathematical fictionalists think that mathematics is indispensable to 
science, yet we can construe mathematical statements in a fictional-
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ist way without nominalisation, e.g. Balaguer (1996, 1998a, 2015); 
and Leng (2010)). 
Over the past three decades several fictionalist approaches have 
been developed and applied to mathematics, scientific theories, mo-
dality, truth, propositions, morality, fictional characters, and more. 
Brock (2002), Everett (2013) and Walton (1985, 1990, 2000) defend 
fictionalism about fictional characters. Balaguer (1998a), Crimmins 
(1998) and Kroon (2004) defend fictionalism about propositional 
attitude reports. Everett (2005) and Kroon (2000) put forward a 
fictionalist interpretation of negative existentials. Balaguer (1998b), 
Melia (2000) and Yablo (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002) defend differ-
ent versions of fictionalism about mathematical discourse. Kalderon 
(2005b) and Nolan et al. (2005) defend moral fictionalism. Van 
Inwagen (1990) and Dorr and Rosen (2002) advance fictionalism 
about ordinary objects. Armstrong (1989), Divers (1999), Kim 
(2005), Nolt (1986) and Rosen (1990) advance fictionalism about 
modal discourse. Burgess and Burgess (2011), and Woodbridge 
(2005) defend fictionalism about truth. Finally, in recent years Frigg 
(2010a,b,c), Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2009), Toon (2012), and Levy 
(2015) have defended different varieties of fictionalism about scien-
tific models.
3 Distinctions and qualifications 
Fictionalists interpret claims made within a region of discourse D at 
face value. If D involves apparent reference to exotic entities, this can 
be true only if such entities exist. Ontological scruples prevent us to 
accept such entities. Hence, D is false. Yet, its virtues are detached 
from the entities that would have to exist to make it true. This is a 
rough characterization of fictionalism that can be refined according 
to some important further distinctions.
A first standard distinction that has been drawn in the contem-
porary debate is between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism. 
(This terminology was originally introduced by Stanley (2001), who 
was inspired by Burgess’s (1983) distinction between hermeneutic 
and revolutionary nominalism. See also Burgess and Rosen 1997). 
Hermeneutic fictionalism about D is a descriptive thesis according 
to which when engaging in D we pretend to aim at literal truth and 
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we pretend to refer to the exotic entities that would be required for 
D to be true. Revolutionary fictionalism, on the contrary, is a pre-
scriptive thesis according to which when engaging in D we ought to 
pretend to appeal to literal truth and we ought to pretend to refer to 
the problematic entities. 
For example, Van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism 
might be understood as a form of hermeneutic fictionalism (although 
Rosen (1994) individuates a difficulty with this interpretation), 
while Mackie’s (1977) moral fictionalism and Field’s (1980) nomi-
nalism could be understood as a form of revolutionary fictionalism. 
Van Fraassen argues that acceptance of a scientific theory is normed 
by its empirical adequacy: when a scientist accepts a theory she does 
not need to believe that it is true and she does not need to assert 
it. Mackie, on the contrary, claims that moral discourse involves 
assertoric claims that, if taken at face value, would commit us to 
implausible moral properties. Hence, moral discourse ought to be 
understood as a merely useful fiction. Similarly, Field argues that 
people who accept and utter a mathematical claim actually believe 
its content and they assert it, hence committing themselves to an im-
plausible ontology of abstract entities. Thus, mathematical discourse 
ought to be reformed: acceptance of a mathematical claim should be 
normed by its being deductively useful in mediating inferences be-
tween nominalistic statements. 
A second important distinction that has been drawn in the con-
temporary debate is between what I will call XVHÀFWLRQDOLVP and se-
PDQWLFÀFWLRQDOLVP. Use fictionalism is a thesis about the use of sen-
tences involving apparent reference to exotic entities within D. Most 
fictionalists distinguish between a fictionalist or pretend use of sen-
tences and a literal or genuinely assertive use. In fictionalist uses of 
sentences pretence affects the force of the relevant speech act. So, for 
example, one who rejects numbers might interpret an utterance of 
‘there are numbers’ in a fictionalist spirit, as an act of pretend as-
sertion that does not commit us to the existence of numbers, or she 
might interpret the same utterance as an act of genuine or literal as-
sertion that would be untrue because there are no numbers. 
Semantic fictionalism is a thesis about the semantic content of 
sentences involving apparent reference to exotic entities within D. 
Some philosophers of fiction argue that when we utter sentences in-
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volving apparent reference to fictional characters in the process of 
story telling or in reporting the content of a story from an internal 
perspective we do this in a fictionalist spirit. Vonnegut merely pre-
tends to assert that Billy Pilgrim was born in 1922 in Ilium without 
genuinely asserting that this was really the case. And we, as readers, 
might pretend to assert that Billy was born in Ilium when report-
ing the content of the story from an internal perspective. Pretend 
uses of the name ‘Billy Pilgrim’ do not commit us to the existence 
of a referent for the name. Since the name does not have any truth-
conditional content, uses of sentences involving them do not express 
any proposition. When Vonnegut says, in pretence, that Billy was 
born in Ilium he merely pretends to express a proposition about Billy 
without really expressing anything. This view was originally put for-
ward by Walton (1990), and was later endorsed by others, including 
Kripke (2013), Van Inwagen (1977), and Schiffer (1996).
Realists about fictional characters argue that we intend our ut-
terances as genuinely true assertions that would commit us to the 
existence of fictional entities (e.g. abstracta, possibilia, or Meinon-
gian non-existent entities) when we talk from a real world per-
spective (e.g., Kripke 2013, Schiffer 1996, Thomasson 1999, Van 
Inwagen 1977). For example, we might say that Billy Pilgrim is a 
fictional character, that he was created by Vonnegut in 1969, that he 
was based on Vonnegut’s comrade Edward R. Crone Jr., and so on 
and forth. Against this interpretation, fictionalists such as Walton 
(1990), Brock (2002) and Kroon (2000) defend the idea that this 
kind of discourse also involves pretence and is therefore ontologically 
non-committal. Only Walton, however, appeals to the notion of se-
mantic pretence for all utterances involving apparent references to 
fictional individuals. (This semantic interpretation has been strongly 
criticized, among others, by Richard (2000)).
Third, Yablo (2001) distinguishes four main varieties of fiction-
alism. First, according to LQVWUXPHQWDOLVW ÀFWLRQDOLVP we pretend to 
assert that S and we pretend to believe that S for the purpose of 
simplifying a theory or shortening a proof. Field (1980) would be 
an example of instrumentalism because he recommends to quasi-
assert certain things about mathematical objects for the purpose of 
shortening certain proofs of statements about ordinary objects. The 
instrumentalist, however, does not explain what we are really doing 
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when we engage in pretence and why we do this. When we pretend 
to assert that S or to believe that S it seems that we pretend to assert 
something and to believe something, but the instrumentalist does 
not say what it is that we pretend to assert or pretend to believe. As a 
consequence, she cannot explain what makes a certain pretend asser-
tion correct (e.g. 2+3=5) and another incorrect (e.g. 2+3=6). Also, 
when we pretend to assert that S and pretend to believe that S it looks 
like we genuinely assert that S and genuinely believe that S. But the 
instrumentalist does not explain how quasi-assertion and pretend-
belief fall short of genuine assertion and genuine belief.
Second, according to PHWDÀFWLRQDOLVP when we pretend to as-
sert that S we are really asserting that according to the fiction, S. 
Van Fraassen (1980) would be an example of meta-fictionalism. He 
thinks of scientific statements as correct if and only if they are part of 
a theory that is empirically adequate and claims that to quasi-assert 
that S amounts to genuinely assert that according to an empirically 
adequate theory, S. Similarly, Field (1989) claims that quasi-asserting 
that, e.g., 2+3=5 can amount to genuinely assert that according to 
standard math, 2+3=5. One problem for this view concerns the 
modal properties of mathematical claims. Mathematical statements 
such as 2+3=5 are thought to be necessary and a priori, while it is 
not necessary or a priori that according to standard math, 2+3=5 
since perhaps standard math could have been different. Second, 
when we say that the number of starving people is rising we seem to 
care about the people themselves, not about how things are accord-
ing to standard math. Third, when we say that the number of starv-
ing people is rising, our subject matter seems to be the people rather 
than standard math.
Third, according to object ÀFWLRQDOLVP what is true in a fiction de-
pends upon what is really true, or true in reality. When one pretends 
to assert that S one is really asserting that the world is in a certain 
condition, i.e. the one that is needed to make it true in the fiction 
that S. On this view, S is quasi-assertible if and only if according to 
the fiction, S. However, the condition that is needed to make it true 
in the fiction that S is that the real content of S obtains. This variety 
of fictionalism helps solving the problems faced by the other varie-
ties described above. When we pretend to assert that the number 
of starving people is rising we are really saying that the number of 
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starving people is rising, and so the subject matter of our concern are 
real people that we care about. Furthermore, the content of 2+3=5 
does not involve any explicit reference to standard math, which guar-
antees that the statement ‘2+3=5’ is necessary and a priori. How-
ever, Brock (1993) and Rosen (1993) argued against Rosen’s (1990) 
original modal fictionalism by showing that the approach commits 
the fictionalist to the very entities that she rejects. So, for example, 
on this view ‘necessarily there exist many worlds’ is quasi-assertible 
if and only if according to the fiction of possible worlds there exist 
many worlds. And the condition that is needed to make it true in the 
fiction of possible worlds that there exist many worlds is exactly that 
there really exist many worlds. (See Nolan and O’Leary-Hawthorne 
1996 for a generalisation of this objection to other sorts of fictional-
ism).
Fourth, according to Yablo’s preferred approach, or ÀJXUDOLVP, we 
should distinguish between two roles that the problematic entities 
apparently referred within D can play. Sometimes they function as 
representations, e.g. ‘the number of Martian moons is 2’; some other 
times they function as the things represented, e.g. ‘there are numbers’. 
In the first case the problematic entities function as representations 
in a figurative description of ordinary objects. In the second case 
they are the objects represented. Some other times, however, they 
can function both as representations and as the objects represented. 
So, for example, a fictionalist says something true (on her own view) 
when she says that “the number of natural numbers is zero”. In this 
case numbers function as representations (‘number’) and as the ob-
jects represented (‘natural numbers’). Thus, figuralism has the ad-
vantages of object fictionalism above the other views, but it does not 
commit us to the existence of the problematic entities apparently 
referred to within D. 
A fourth distinction that is often drawn in the contemporary de-
bate on fictionalism concerns the mental attitudes we have towards 
the problematic claims made within D. Some claim that our atti-
tude towards statements made within D is one of acceptance rath-
er than belief. Van Fraassen (1980) originally introduced this idea 
concerning our attitude towards statements made within scientific 
discourse, while Sainsbury (2009) recently suggested that accept-
ance would be the appropriate attitude towards discourse about fic-
11Fictionalism
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tion and non-existent objects more generally. Others are inspired by 
Walton’s (1990, 1993) influential account of make-believe, or im-
agination, as the relevant attitude we have towards fictions. So, for 
example, Yablo’s (1998, 2001, 2002) figuralism exploits Walton’s 
notion of make-believe as involving props such as baby dolls, hobby 
horses, but also paintings and novels. On Walton’s account props are 
ordinary objects that generate fictional truths in virtue of there be-
ing a prescription to imagine something either explicitly stipulated 
or implicitly stipulated as being in force within a certain pretence. 
Walton (1993) introduced a notion of prop-oriented make-believe 
that plays an important role in his account of metaphor and that is 
endorsed by Yablo. In this case make-believe helps understanding 
the props themselves by describing them in ways that are different 
from how they actually are. On this view statements made within D 
are best understood as metaphorical, or figurative. And metaphors 
involve prop-oriented make-believe. For example, a sentence such as 
‘Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot’ is not literally true, since 
Italy is not a boot. But we learn something about the real location of 
Crotone by imagining of Italy that it is a boot and that Crotone is on 
its arch. (See Wearing 2012 and Camp 2009 for criticisms to this 
notion of metaphor). Alternatively, Yablo (2006) suggests that when 
we engage in mathematical discourse we presuppose that mathemat-
ical entities exist without really believing it. Notice, however, that 
these are technical notions that might be assimilated to one another 
depending upon their characterisation. 
4 Problems for fictionalism
I will conclude this entry by considering some paradigmatic argu-
ments against fictionalism as a general metaphysical strategy. Some 
contemporary philosophers have questioned the distinction between 
acceptance and belief (see, O’Leary-Hawthorne 1994; Horwich 
2004; and Daly 2008 for a response). Others have noticed that many 
fictionalists appeal to the notion of abstract objects such as stories, 
propositions, and more for the purpose of explaining the relevant 
phenomena (see Walton 1990: ch. 10 for an explicit endorsement 
of abstract entities that are not fictional characters). One worry one 
might have is that each different variety of fictionalism about a cer-
Fiora Salis12
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tain area should provide specific motivation for scepticism towards 
some abstract entities but not others. A second worry one might have 
is that those fictionalists that reject all abstract entities, and in par-
ticular revolutionary fictionalists, should not appeal to other enti-
ties that by their own standards would be also suspicious (e.g. Daly 
2008).
Here are some more specific worries. One argument against 
revolutionary fictionalism is that it attributes massive error to agents 
engaged in apparently serious discourse about morality, mathemat-
ics, scientific theories and more. For example, Mackie thought that 
our ordinary moral judgments are systematically mistaken, and Field 
claimed something similar of mathematical claims. Some have criti-
cized this and similar versions of revolutionary fictionalism about 
mathematics on charge of philosophical immodesty. It is ridiculously 
immodest, so the critic argues, to hold that the successful practition-
ers of a scientific discipline like mathematics would be involved in 
systematic and massive mistakes (Burgess 2004, Burgess and Rosen 
2005; see Leng 2005, and Daly 2006 for different responses). 
One classical argument against fictionalism of the hermeneutic 
variety concerns the phenomenology of pretence. An interpretation 
of apparently non-figurative literal discourse as involving pretence 
and make-believe would be implausible. So, for example, realists 
about fictional characters insist that external discourse about them 
(discourse performed from a real world perspective) involves gen-
uinely true assertions that commit us to the existence of fictional 
entities (e.g., Kripke 2013, Schiffer 1996, Thomasson 1999, Van 
Inwagen 1977). So, it seems that when in his preface to Martin Chuz-
zlewit Dickens wrote that “Mrs Gamp was a fair representation of the 
hired attendant on the poor in sickness” it seems that he is engaging 
in genuine assertions that can be valuated for genuine truth and falsi-
ty. External discourse does not seem to involve any sort of pretence.
One reply that has been offered to this sort of argument is that 
we engage in make-believe and pretence discourse even when we 
do not notice it (Walton 1990). A second reply consists in arguing 
that when it comes to deciding on whether we are engaged in pre-
tence theoretical considerations should prevail on phenomenological 
considerations (Kroon 2011). Another possible reply is to claim that 
when we engage in discourse about objects that we know do not ex-
2014 Edition
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ist we do not need to appeal to pretence or make-believe. Perhaps 
acceptance is a better notion, one that is involved in fictional dis-
course but also in non-fictional discourse (Sainsbury 2009). So, for 
example, when claiming that Vulcan was the planet responsible for 
the perturbations of Mercury’s orbit we accept that Vulcan existed 
without really believing. Yet, acceptance would be a broader notion 
possibly encompassing make-believe, but also presupposing, assum-
ing and so on. (This notion of acceptance was originally introduced 
in Stalnaker 1984).
A second argument against fictionalism of the hermeneutic va-
riety concerns the notion of compositional semantics. The worry is 
that pretence accounts of D do not involve any systematic relation-
ship between different kinds of sentences and their real world truth-
conditions (Stanley 2001). For example, on Walton’s interpretation 
of true negative existential claims such as ‘Sherlock Holmes does 
not exist’ we use the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ to pretend to refer to 
Sherlock Holmes and then immediately betray this pretence by say-
ing that he does not exist. In other words, Walton does not offer a 
compositional semantics of negative existential claims. By extension, 
a similar problem arises also in figurative interpretations of math-
ematical discourse, moral discourse, scientific discourse and so on. 
In other words, it is not clear whether a fictionalist account of D can 
explain the compositionality of the language involved in D.
The fictionalist can reply by biting the bullet and simply saying 
that, as Yablo (2001) does, that we can understand many kinds of 
metaphorical or figurative speech whose semantics does not seem 
to be compositional, e.g. irony, hyperbole, metonymy and more. 
By analogy, fictionalist interpretations of D do not need to be wor-
ried by the lack of a compositional semantics for D. A different re-
ply that is compatible with other approaches to the semantics of fic-
tional discourse is simply to reject Walton’s semantic pretence and 
endorse a uniform semantics for fictional discourse and non-fictional 
discourse. In this way, the problem of compositionality for fictional 
discourse simply disappears.
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